This paper explores the place of Hegel in Gadamer's hermeneutics through an analysis of the idea of "in nite dialogue." It is argued that in nite dialogue cannot be understood as a limited Hegelianism, i.e., as the life of spirit in language that does not reach its end. Rather, in nite dialogue can be understood only by taking the Heideggerian idea of radical nitude seriously. Thus, while in nite dialogue has a speculative element, it remains a dialogue conditioned by the occlusion in temporal becoming. This idea is developed further by contrasting Gadamer's position with that of Blanchot, who also stands under the shadow of Hegel.
One can readily see from a reading of Truth and Method that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics owes much to Hegel.
1 Gadamer explicitly tells us that with respect to the development of his hermeneutics of history, he wants to hold to a model of integration rather than reconstruction and, accordingly, sees it as his task to follow Hegel more than Schleiermacher.
2 This broad alignment with Hegel, though, is obviously not without quali cation. Gadamer himself characterizes his proximity to Hegel as "a strained closeness" (eine spannungsvolle Nähe) because the critique of a "philosophy of re ection," in terms of which Gadamer aligns himself with Hegel, is generated by the dialectical method. Gadamer sees in Hegel's use of the dialectical method "a dubious compromise with the scienti c thinking of modernity" 3 and therefore always wants, at the same time, to distance himself from Hegel. This distance is accomplished in Gadamer's eyes by insisting that philosophical hermeneutics takes nitude seriously and that dialogue is not to be equated with dialectic. mark of distance that does not constitute a real diVerence at all. It can be argued that Gadamer's whole of tradition is but a variation on the Hegelian "truth is the whole," that dialogue remains wedded to determination not unlike Hegelian concrete universality, and that the movement of tradition is not unlike the movement of spirit that wants to make itself at home in the world.
The problem with respect to the nature of this distance has much to do with the fact that, unlike Heidegger, Gadamer continues to reference nitude in relation to in nity and to link understanding to a process of mediation. Consider the way in which Gadamer announces his project in the Preface to Truth and Method. As a philosophical concern, the project of philosophical hermeneutics wants to "discover what is common to all modes of understanding" (TM, xxxi). What is to be discovered is the fact that understanding is caught up in an "eVective history" that is prior to all conscious intending of meaning. This condition of always thinking from history is the mark of our nitude: "Historically eVected consciousness," Gadamer writes, "is so radically nite that our whole being, eVected in the totality of our destiny, inevitably transcends its knowledge of itself " (TM, xxxiv). From this condition of nitude, of the in nite separation of being from its understanding, Gadamer further claims that "the province of hermeneutics is universal" and adds "that language is the form in which understanding is achieved" (TM, xxxiv). On the basis of Gadamer's subsequent analysis in Truth and Method, we know that this achievement of understanding by language enacts a peculiar mediation: through language the structure of experience is formed and constantly changed whereby the order of being comes into existence as if for the rst time. This dynamic of language, which in eVect is the self-relation of language to its own diVerence, occurs as dialogue. Thus Gadamer writes in the Preface that understanding is achieved in "the in nity of the dialogue" (TM, xxxiv).
This phrase is most intriguing and can be taken as the focal point for working out the precise character of Hegel's shadow in Gadamer's hermeneutics. In taking hold of this phrase, though, we are immediately confronted with diYculty, since it is not entirely evident what Gadamer means by the phrase "the in nity of the dialogue." It is not clear, in other words, how dialogue expresses through its in nity the experience of nitude. Even if we introduce at this point Gadamer's repeated statement that with respect to his proximity to Hegel, he wants to "save the honor of the bad in nity," we still do not have
